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Active Shooter Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks

Following on from our observations of the recent events in Paris and Jakarta, we were pleased to deliver a training session to a range of Country Risk Managers on ASMTFA at the Strategic Risk Forum in Singapore on behalf of NYA International at the request of AIG. The session was well received and covered issues of planning and risk mitigation, as well as PR, legal and compliance issues.  Unfortunately the outlook for Australia is not positive, and we suspect that many venues present soft targets, such as airports, shopping centres, schools and the like. Intelligence and security collection is unlikely to detect and disrupt these attacks before they happen, and so planning for a realistic scenario is the most preferred option to reduce risk, loss of reputation and civil liability.

Should Multiple Drink Driving Disqualifications result in Cumulative Sentences?

Today we argued that s 90B of the Traffic Operations (Road Use Management) Act (TORUM) 1995 (Qld) does not mandate that two separate drink driving offences committed within a short period of each other must lead to cumulative disqualifications. Magistrate Carmody agreed and concluded that the sentencing function of the Magistrate is discretionary, and therefore the totality principle should be applied.

In this case the first minor drink driving offence (over the general and under the medium limit) took place while the defendant was not the holder of a driver license, and the second took place within a few hours when the defendant attempted to move their car.
A Traffic Operations (Road Use Management) Act (TORUM) 1995 (Qld) s 79(2) offence carries a mandatory minimum of a three month disqualification by virtue of s 86 (2) (e). The first offence of driving while unlicensed does not carry a mandatory disqualification period. The second offending just after the defendant had been released by the police, resulted in him being charged with another unlicensed offence, and a drink driving offence over the 0.00 limit (due to the defendant being unlicensed they were required to be 0.00). The defendant’s licence had expired two weeks previously.

Totality Principle

We argued that the drink driving disqualifications should be served concurrently, applying the totality principle. R v. Kendrick [2015] QCA 27 discusses the principal of totality, and while the application was in relation to much more serious offences, it is helpful here. At paragraph 31 his Honour Morrison JA said of the Totality Principal:
That principle was explained in Mill v The Queen when the High Court approved this statement from Thomas, Principles of Sentencing “The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate is ‘just and appropriate’. The principle has been stated many times in various forms: ‘when a number of offences are being dealt with and specific punishments in respect of them are being totted up to make a total, it is always necessary for the court to take a last look at the total just to see whether it looks wrong[‘]; ‘when … cases of multiplicity of offences come before the court, the court must not content itself by doing the arithmetic and passing the sentence which the arithmetic produces. It must look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and ask itself what is the appropriate sentence for all the offences.’”

At paragraph 39, quoting Azzopardi v The Queen, his Honour noted that there are two ways to apply the principal, either by “….making sentences wholly or partially concurrent or by lowering the individual sentences below what would otherwise be appropriate in order to reflect the fact that a number of sentences are being imposed. Where practicable, the former is to be preferred”.

Section 90B creates confusion, but has been relied upon by Police and Qld Transport (using the so called ‘Dummies Guide’ to the TORUM) to submit that cumulative disqualifications would apply in such a case.

Section 90 B states:
90B Cumulative periods of disqualification for offences committed at different times
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a person is disqualified (the initiating disqualification)—
(i) under a relevant disqualifying provision for a drink driving offence; or
(ii) under a section 89 disqualification; or
(iii) under a section 90 disqualification; and
(b) before the period of disqualification for the initiating disqualification ends, the person is disqualified again on 1 or more occasions (a later disqualification) as mentioned in paragraph (a).
(2) However, this section does not apply if section 90C applies.
(3) Each period of disqualification whether for an initiating disqualification or later disqualification takes effect cumulatively with each other period of disqualification.
Examples—
1 D is charged with a drink driving offence. Before the court hears that charge D is charged again with a drink driving offence. The court convicts D of both offences and disqualifies D for a period of 2 months for 1 offence and a period of 4 months for the other offence. The total period of disqualification is 6 months.
2 D commits a drink driving offence on 25 December 2008 and commits another drink driving offence on 1 January 2009. A court convicts D of the 1 January offence on 2 January 2009 and disqualifies D for a period of 2 months. On 1 February, the court convicts D of the 25 December offence and disqualifies D for a period of 4 months. The total period of disqualification is 6 months.

Kumar v Garvey discusses s 90 B. In obiter McGill DCJ, who allowed an appeal in that case on other issues said: “I should also refer to s 90B of the Act. The effect of this provision appears to be that the two periods of disqualification imposed by the magistrate were cumulative. I say “appears to be” because the section is strangely worded, and to me produces that result only if one assumes that a person is disqualified at the time the offence is committed, rather than at the time when an order is made under the Act imposing the disqualification, or by the terms of the Act, a disqualification is imposed. That it would apply to the present case is consistent with example 1, which is part of the section, though it seems to me that otherwise it would be difficult to tease that outcome out of the words used by the legislature”.

When dealing with mandatory minimums, it is appropriate to consider the combined effect of all the disqualification periods, and consider whether the aggregate is ‘just and appropriate’.

In this case the defendant had only a very minor traffic history, and no drink driving offences in the defendant’s past. If two mandatory disqualifications of three months had been ordered to be served cumulatively, the impact would have been unjust and harsh, and would not be appropriate given the level of the defendant’s culpability.

While a minor piece of advocacy in the greater scheme of things, in our view the TORUM is a legislative nightmare for practitioners and defendants alike, and it is appropriate that it be carefully considered. As McGill DCJ stated (para 22) “Mandatory sentencing provisions are frequently the subject of judicial and academic condemnation whenever they appear. Generally, Queensland is mercifully free from some of the worst excesses in this area which may be found in other states, but ss 78, 79, and 86 of the Act contain detailed and complex mandatory sentencing provisions which deserve all the principled criticism directed at mandatory sentencing. The sections have been much amended over the years, in what appears to be a process of populism”.

Release of 60 Minutes Crew and mother Sally Faulkner sets up a Potential Diplomatic Incident

The release on bail of the 60 Minutes crew, and the mother of the attempted victims of an abduction in Lebanon, may be kicking the can down the road in terms of impact. We would expect that the Lebanese judicial system will want these individuals to return to face Court, in the quite likely event that they will be indicted on some offences. Should Tara Brown and the crew decide not to attend for a future Court date, this is likely to lead to blow back on the Australian Government, especially as Australian Embassy Consular staff were seemingly involved in helping them to leave the country. Assuming the allegation is sustained regarding the involvement of 60 minutes in organising the kidnapping, their absence will mean that not all of the alleged perpetrators are present to be tried.

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/broadcast/nines-milliondollar-getoutofjail-card-in-beirut/news-story/ab23cd8c2a5acb5de103372b671d64a3?login=1

Legal Issues in Lebanon

The arrest of Sally Faulkner, the 60 Minutes crew led by Tara Brown and the representatives of a child recovery company in Lebanon demonstrate the need for careful consideration and expert knowledge prior to making decisions about the operation of laws in a foreign jurisdiction. One can only be knowledgeable about so many locations, and nothing beats a detailed familiarity of a particular location. Our advice would have included an insight into the operation and remarkable capabilities of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and the General Directorate of General Security (Direction Générale de la Sûreté known as GDSG) in Lebanon, and clear counsel not to attempt to circumvent the laws of Lebanon. Lebanon is complex and can be dangerous. The Lebanese are nationalistic, albeit following consideration of family, village, sect and then country, and can be expected to enforce the law and prosecution of breaches of it, with transparent and officious diligence.

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/60-minutes-crew-on-lebanon-charges-of-kidnap-assault-conspiracy/news-story/3a98f216b0ac8c2faf7b804060ffbd57

 

Brussels Causes Inevitable Media Driven Search to Determine Whether Something was Missed

The very sad events in Brussels, like in Paris and elsewhere, has resulted in the inevitable media driven search to determine whether something was missed by law enforcement or intelligence agencies that could have prevented the attack.

As other commentators are now beginning to concede, these sorts of attacks are very difficult to thwart. Terrorism is a conspiracy to commit murder. In this current age, the conspirators rarely receive anything other than inspiration from overseas. In such cases, using techniques that are not difficult to learn, it is easy to conceal a conspiracy until the attack takes place.
Whether we like it or not we now live in a far riskier climate, created in large part by erroneous responses to terrorism threats (led by our following of the US coalition) that now seem a distant memory. And as a result, it is even more important that law enforcement agencies remain nimble and responsive to leads and tip offs, as it is now even less likely that ‘chatter’ or intelligence collection will provide warnings of plots that will cause real terror in our communities.

The ineffectiveness of our agencies’ response is partly due to the fact that they have cast too wide a net in looking at Islamic communities, and by looking at too many (not prepared to let anything fall off the table), do not remain nimble enough to look at the few that emerge as threats. It is also partly because fifteen years of suspicion levelled at these communities – bordering on paranoia and constant surveillance – has driven many who may never have been a threat, to be easily influenced by others and inspired. In this way, they can in fact become a threat.

I am hopeful that changes in the policy response and therefore the rhetoric will result in a breaking down of these issues over time. But until then, how do we deal with the current threat? On the one hand we need to remove the justification for terrorism – by being seen not to be suspicious and paranoid of our Islamic citizens and residents. On the other, we need to be vigilant and report on those that might be seeking to do us harm, and act swiftly to stop them. Sadly the current need for the latter may have the same effect as our previous polices and responses. And of course, more terrorism will feed into the rhetoric of some politicians that Islam really is a threat.

Justin Sibley – Specialist Consultant

At the request of Saul Holt QC, Justin Sibley provided expert guidance on a recent terrorism case, and in particular assisted in preparing the cross examination of the expert witness. Justin Sibley is in a strong position to assist on these types of cases, as he tends to know the witnesses that the Australian Federal Police and ASIO rely on, and often knows as much about the region and the issues as they do.

Brisbane Criminal lawyer and consultant - Justin Sibley

Farhad Jabar – Four Corners Program

[fusion_text]Written by: Justin Sibley  Published: 27 January 2015

[dropcap color=”” boxed=”yes” boxed_radius=”0px” class=”” id=””]T[/dropcap]he Four Corners program recently aired an interesting documentary on Farhad Jabar, who murdered a unsworn member of the NSW Police Service in Parramatta. The underlying theme of the documentary, is the involvement of conspirators from earlier plots (spanning back to Operation Pendennis). What the program does not do, is talk about the potential alienation caused by the involvement of law enforcement and security forces around the world, who have unwittingly encouraged individuals to develop their dislike for the West. Similar mistakes may be occurring again, through the unrelenting focus and suspicion levelled against individuals involved in the conflict in Syria, attempting to overthrow President Bashar al Assad. Policies such as legislation targeting Foreign Fighters, and simplistic approaches to terrorism financing investigations, do little to help prevent a new generation of would-be terrorists. A more balanced discussion of the issues is needed, including an understanding of the peculiar role that Syria plays for Lebanese Australians in particular. 

To watch the full program, please visit: http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2015/11/23/4355252.htm[/fusion_text]

Paris, a sign of things to come and an alternative rhetoric

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Written by: Justin Sibley   Published: 18 November 2015

[dropcap color=”” boxed=”yes” boxed_radius=”0px” class=”” id=””]T[/dropcap]he coordinated attacks on the weekend in Paris were markedly similar to the ‘suicide shooter’ attacks that took place in Mumbai in 2008, where coordinated shooters and bombers attacked hotels, cafes, and public transport. Following that incident, security and intelligence professionals feared more incidents of this style to follow.

But the reported incidents were surprisingly low, especially given how inexpensive and easily planned these attacks are – and given the attraction a suicide shooter attack would hold to a would be extremist that may not quite be prepared to detonate a suicide vest, but might be persuaded to participate in an attack where the chances of escaping are higher. Creating suicide explosives is more difficult, whereas long and short arms such as assault rifles and pistols are readily available on black markets. The markers have certainly been there in more recent times: such as the killing of Lee Rigby in a brutal public display in London, and the attacks in the USA, such as in Texas on a Prophet Mohammed cartoon competition by two gunmen. Rigby’s killing reinforces that you don’t even need shooting weapons to cause fear. In Sydney, the Martin Place siege and the Parramatta shooting of a civilian police member should act as worrying indicators.

But, we should not forget that terrorism is a conspiracy to commit murder. Islamic motivations are just a contemporaneous driver to satisfy human need to for violence. Other non-Muslim religious extremists conduct attacks in the USA and in Israel for example, without anywhere near the same international condemnation. Our politicians and media benefit from fear, and that fear in turn exacerbates the problem. But few would have thought following 9/11 that we would be facing the spread of violence that we are now. 

Unfortunately the coalition’s response to 9/11 and the somewhat simplistic and aggressive campaign that followed has succeeded in creating the ‘War on Terror’. This will not end quickly. More and more individuals with fear and hatred grow up in places like Miran Shah and Wana faster than American and other partner intelligence agencies can identify them, and the drones can kill them, and it seems all too easy for individuals in Western countries to be motivated to commit terrorism. The actions of nations in the face of what was thought to be a justifiable threat, through examples such as Guantanamo Bay, and the assassination of Bin Laden, has only served to send the wrong message and create more and more anger. More recently France appears to be experiencing a disproportionate response to its firm protection of freedom of speech. But recalling the history of France’s former ‘colonial’ control of certain Muslim lands, and understanding the makeup of France’s Muslim population as a result, can provide some relevant context. 

It was perhaps hard to predict that a simplistic approach to regime change in Iraq would lead to the displacement and marginalization of the majority of Sunnis previously aligned (often through necessity) to the Baathist regime. Imprisoned or discarded, unemployed without pensions, it was only a matter of time before a new sectarian divide sending ripples across the Muslim world would lead some individuals to join a militant response. ISIL is arguably a foreseeable bi-product of a simplistic Western intervention in Iraq spurred on by a failure to act in Syria to curb a humanitarian disaster.

Further, our fear of Muslims has increased marginalisation and with it the potential that individuals would identify with these events and eventually turn against other relatively free societies in which they live, and may even have been born. Security intelligence organisations may have aided the sense of marginalisation. Which came first, the threat or the paranoia? We do need intelligence agencies to protect us, but we should also learn some lessons from the ‘reds under the beds’ paranoia of the Communism days. Not every Muslim is a would be terrorist to be scrutinized and investigated.

This is not to say that some of the individuals profiled and investigated haven’t been involved in terrorism. In some cases the plots were missed, but the individuals had come to attention in the past and been discounted- such as Man Monis in Sydney. We cannot follow everyone, nor predict every threat. At the same time, our suspicion, and at times overt interference, can play a role. Increasingly we are seeing youths, who perhaps in a previous generation would have been engaged in truancy or graffiti, attracted and manipulated to this violence.

The problem exists now, whether we have responded in the best way possible or not. So what do we do? In my opinion, we need to understand the complexities of the conflicts and avoid gross simplifications, such as branding all ‘foreign fighters’ as enemies. This simply doesn’t help and only works to win votes and feed popular fear. We should look into and have a deeper understanding at a political level of the regions we are attempting to comment on and or interfere in, or we should avoid getting involved altogether. That option may sadly have passed. We should now carefully consider our response to things like the Paris attacks. In France’s case, was shutting the borders and declaring a state of emergency the right response, or does that assist in vilifying Muslim communities, in turn creating new willing recruits? There is a threat, but we can respond in a more careful and subtle way that does not fuel fear and help to marginalise. 

The key is to get back to the basic point that terrorism is a conspiracy to commit murder, albeit mass murder. You either have a conspiracy or you don’t. It is easy to brand a particular religion as the threat, when in fact the offenders fall clearly within recognizable criteria which can be detected and prevented using traditional intelligence and law enforcement tools. We need to remain vigilant and report all suspicious activity, but not act on paranoia and flawed logic, and inadvertently feed into the plans of groups such as ISIL, by helping to push innocent people to become criminals.

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